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I. Introduction
The “technology factor,11in either its embodied or disembodied
form, is increasingly recognized as a major source of differences in
productivity and welfare over the and among nations.~ Yet technical
change is one of the more difficult products for a country in the early
stages of economic develo~ent to produce. In agriculture the initial
success of the “green revolutionll has resulted in renewed interest in
the economic and institutional considerations involved in international
technology transfer.ti
The international diffusion of agricultural technology is not new.
The classical studies by Sauer and Vavilov and the more recent cytoge-
netic studies of plant origins indicate that the international and
intercontinentaldiffusion of cultivated plants, domestic animals, hand
tools, and husbandry
in prehistory and in
that the transfer of
practices was a major source of productivity growth
/ It is well known the classical civilizations.s
new crops (potatoes,maize, tobacco, and others)
from the new continents to Europe after the discovery of America had a
dramatic impact on European agriculture, The technological bases for
the staple exports of many developing countries -- cocoa in West Africa-2-
and rubber in Southeast Asia, for example, -- occurred as a result of
the international diffusion of crop varieties.
Before agricultural research and extension were
this diffusion took place as a by-product of
communication undertaken primarily for other
gestation period -- several decades and even





centuries -- exotic plants,
were gradually introduced
and adapted to local conditions. In the 19th century the international
diffusion process became more highly institutionalized. National govern-
ments established agencies to deliberately seek out and introduce exotic
crop varieties and animal breeds. ~ Colonial governments and the great
trading companies operating under their protection sought to introduce
crops with export potential into new areas of cultivation. These efforts
have, over time, had a substantial impact on the location of staple pro-
duction and on international trading patterns in crop and animal products.
The enormous agricultural productivity differences
combined with the success of earlier diffusion efforts,
among countries,
have often been
interpreted to imply that more effective diffusion of known agricultural
technology among countries could represent an efficient source of economic
growth in agricultural productivity and production in the less developed
countries. This perspective imposed a !l~ive diffusionllor lfextension
bias~lto much of the national and international aid efforts for agricul-
tural development that emerged titer World War II. In reviewing the-3”
agricultural development efforts of the 1950’s ~d early 1960’sV
Albert Moseman emphasized that “this ‘extensionbias’ met with only
limited success because of the paucity of applicable indigenous tech-
nology and the general unsuitability of U.S. temperate zone ~terials
and practices to tropical agricultural conditions.“d
In this paper we draw, from earlier research on the diffusion of
culture and technology, insights that can contribute to a more adequate
understanding of the processes involved in the international transfer of
agricultural technology and the impact of such transfer on the location
of agricultural production and international trade in agricultural com-
modities. This analysis leads us to place major emphasis on the emergence
of national experiment station capacity for adaptive research and develop-
ment as a critical element in the international transfer or “naturalization”
of agricultural technology.--4-
11. Diffusion Models and International Technology Transfer
There are multiple traditions of research on diffusion processes:
in anthropology economics, geography sociology, and other disciplines.
Each tradition has evolved a somewhat different model of the diffusion
process. Aside from differences in terminology, real differences among
these models exist because they are concerned with different aspects of
diffusion phenomena. The main focus of sociologists and geographers has
been on the impact of communication (or interaction) and sociocultural
resistance to innovation on the pattern of diffusion over time and across
space.~/ The models of economists have focused on how economic variables,
such as the profitability of innovation and the asset position of firm%
8/ influence the rate of diffusion._
The models have, with a few exceptions, only limited relevance for
the international transfer of technology in agriculture. They have typ-
ically been designed to describe or analyze diffusion
area over time. The attributes of the technology and
/ While these potential adopters are taken as given.~





ready availability and of direct transferability of the technology represents
a critical limitation in utilizing them to understand the process of inter-
national diffusion in situations where ecological variations and differences
in factor endowments
cultural technology.
among countries inhibit the direct transfer of agri--+
The study by Griliches of the diffusion of hybrid corn represents
s,rare attempt to incorporate the mecha:ni.sm of local adaptation into a
-/ Thestudy isofrelevance because thediffusionof diffusion model.l~
hybrid corn among geographic areas, through the development of locally
adapted varieties, is similar to our view of the process of international
technology transfer in agriculture. l’I~ybrid corn was the invention of a
method of inventing, a method of breeding superior corn for specific
locations. It was not a single invention immediately available everywhere.
The actual breeding of adaptable hybrids had to be done separately for
each area. Hence, besides the differences in the rate of adoption of
hybrids by farmers . . . we have also to explain the lag in the develop-
ment of adaptable hybrids for specific areas . . .l!~
The procedure employed by Griliches was to summarize the diffusion
path for each hybrid corn maturity area by fitting an S-shaped logistic
trend function to data on the percentage of corn area planted with hybrid
seed in each maturity area. The
three parameters -- an origin, a
preted his results as indicating
rate (slope) and level (ceiling)
logistic trend function is described by
slope, and a ceiling. Griliches inter-
that differences among regions in the
of acceptance are both functions of the
profitability of a shift from open-polinated to hybrid corn. Variations
in these two parameters smong regions are thus explained in terms of
farmer’s profit-seeking behavior. In this respect Griliches’ model.is
similar to other diffusion models employed by economists.-6-
What makes the Grilichests study
of international technology transfer,
model the behavior of public research
unique, and relevant to the problem
is that he incorporated into his
institutions and private agricultural
supply firms which make locally adapted hybrid seeds available to farmers.
He attemp-~edto explain variations in the date of origin, or of commercial
avail.ability~ of hybrid corn by the size and density of the hybrid seed




analysis Griliches derived the conclusion that both the
agricultural experiment stations and the commercial seed
guided by the expected return to research, development, and
marketing costs. It is one of the great merits of the Griliches’ model that
it incorporates the mechanism of local adaptation in the interregional transfer
of agricultural technology. This mechanism is based on the behavior of public
research institutions and private agricultural supply firms. Modification
‘themodel is needed, howeverj in applying it to the study of international.
technology transfer. ,
In the United States, there exists a large stock of scientific and
of
technical manpower, a well-structured federal-state experiment station net-
worg and vigorous entrepreneurship in private farm supply firms. The mechanism
for inducing the research and development necessary for local adaptation of
technology functions efficiently. When these conditions are not met, even if
the expected pay-off from the transfer of a particular technology is potentially
very high~ the supply of adaptive research may be very inelastic. The problem
of facilitating international technology transfer as an instrument for agricul--
tural development is, therefore, how to institutionalize an elastic supply of-7-
adaptive research and development. The most serious constraints on
international transfer of agricultural technology are: (a) limited
the
experiment station capacity in the case of biological technology: and
(b) limited industrial capacity in the case of mechanical technology. The
inelastic supply of scientific and technical manpower represents a critical
limiting factor in both cases.-8-
111. Phases of International Technology Transfer
It seems useful to distinguish three phases of international technology
transfer: (a) material transfer, (b) design
transfer.
The first phase is characterized by the
new materials such as seed, plants, animals$
ated with these materials. Local adaptation
transfer, and (c) capacity
simple transfer or import of
machines> and techniques associ-
is not conducted in an orderly
and systematic fashion. The ‘lnaturalization’l of plants and animals tends to
occur primarily as a result of trial and error by farmers.
In the second phase the transfer of technology is made primarily through
the transfer of certain designs (blue prints, formula, books, etc.). During
this period exotic materials are imported in order to copy their designs
rather than for their own use. New plants and animals are subject to orderly
tests and are propagated through systematic multiplication. Machines imported
in the previous phase start to be produced domestically with only slight mod-
ifications in design.
In the third phase technology transfer occurs primarily through the
transfer of scientific knowledge and capacity. The effect is to create the
capacity for the production of locally adapted technology according to the
“proto-type“ technology existing abroad. Increasingly plant and animal vari-
eties are bred locally to adapt them to local ecological conditions. The
design of imported machinery is modified in order to meet climatic and soil
requirements and factor endowments of the economy. An important element in
the process of capacity transfer is the migration of agricultural scientists.-9-
In spite of advances in communications, diffusion
craft of agricultural science, and of science and
of the concepts and
culture generally,
depends heavily on extended personal contact and association. M The
transfer of scientists is often of critical importance in easing the con-
straints on the supply of scientific and technical manpower in the less
developed countries. Much of the institutional development effort of the
international aid agencies can appropriately be viewed, and evaluated
against the objective of speeding entrance of the LDC’S into the capacity
transfer phase.
The three phases of international transfer of agricultural technology
outlined above are tested against two cases: the development and diffusion
of sugarcane varieties, and the transfer of the tractor to the USSR and
Japan.
Devel.opmer$of suparcane varieties . —.. —-—
Robert Evenson~s study on the development of
of interest because it represents a major example
sugarcane varieties is
of the international
transmission of biological technology in agriculture, and because the
process has evolved from a simple transfer of plants to the phase of capacity
transfer.2/
Evenson identified four stages of development in sugarcane varieties:
Stage I -- Natural Selection (Wild Canes). The cane plant reproduces asexually.
Until the late 18001s relatively few wild or native varieties were commercially
produced. These varieties apparently were the result of natural asexual re-
production. They were transmitted between countries, but the transmission was-1o-
extremely slow. For exemple the “Bourbon’i cane~ the major stage I cane
in the 19th century~ was not introduced to the British West Indies until.
1785Y almost a hundred years after it was a commercial cane in Madagascar.
Stage II -- Sexual Reproduction (Noble Canes). The discovery of the
fertility of the sugarcane plant in 1887 independently in Barbados and in
Java established the basis for the breeding of new varieties. Under proper
conditions the cane plant can be induced to flower and produce seedlings.
Each new seedling is then a potential new variety since it can be reproduced
asexually. The early man-made varieties were produced using the existing
commercial 80-chromosome cane species Saccharum Officinarum as parent vari-
eties. Between 1900 and 1920 numerous varieties resulted from this effort.
These varieties were transmitted widely over the world from experiment
stations in Java, India, Barbadosj British Guian% and Hawaii. Many were
distributed to other countries and, when introduced, appeared to be definitely
superior to the native varieties. Only simple tests and demonstrations were
required~ if any, for recipient countries to propagate these varieties. In
many cases, howeverY these new varieties were susceptible to diseases and
their yield advantages were lost,
Stage 111 -- Interspecific Hybridization (Mobilization). The experiment
station in Java (Proefstation Oost Java, P.O.J.) achieved a major advance in
cane breeding by introducing the species Saccharum Spontaneum into their
breeding programs after 1915. Through a series of crosses and back crosses
new interspecific hybrids were developed that incorporated the hardiness and
disease resistance of this non-commercial species. Later, the station at-11-
Coimbatore, India, developed a series of tri-hybrid canes by introducing
a third species$ Saccharum Bmberi. This resulted in the development of
new varieties in India that were specifically adapted to local climate,
soil, and disease conditions. The stage III varieties were disease re-
sistant and high-yielding, notably those from Java and India. They were
transferred to every producing country in the world. While this interna-
tional transmission was widespread, it did not occur easily. The existence
of research and extension capacity in the recipient countries was an impor-
tant factor in determining the rate of diffusion of the new canevarieties.
Stage IV -- Location Specific Breeding. The Coimbatore, India)
station se-tthe stage for modern breeding activity. More than 100 experi-
ment stations are now in existence. In most cases they are pursuing programs
which involve systematic selfing and crossing of parent varieties suitable to
the specific soil, climate disease, and economic conditions of relatively
small regions. Very little international transmission of varieties is now
taking place, as most regions
oped at a regional or natural
It appears reasonable
stages I and TV as clearly
transfer stages. Stage II
to
are producing sugar from cane varieties devel-
experiment station.
interpret sugarcane variety transfers during
belonging to the material transfer and the capacity
appears to be a transition from the material trans-
fer to the design transfer, and stage 111 a transition from the design transfer
to the capacity transfer. Significant implications of this sequence are:
(a) the increasingly important role which the experiment station has played in-12-
developing and “naturalizing “ sugarcane varieties, and (b) the sequence
running from initial international diffusion of superior varieties to the
international diffusion of the capacity to ?’invent~’ location specific
varieties superior to the “naturalized”varieties.
Tractorization in Russia and Japan
One of the dramatic examples of the transfer of mechanical technology
in agriculture was the Soviet adoption of American mechanical technology,
particularly the tractor, during the 1924.-33decade. Also of interest is
the transfer of small-scale mechanical equipment to Japan since the mid-
1950!s. In both cases the experiment station occupied a relatively minor
role, in contrast to the major role of the experiment station in the transfer
of biological technology. An important element in the transfer of machine
technology in agriculture in both the USSR and Japan was the domestic manu-
facturing capacity.
The tractor occupied an important role, for both ideological and
practical reasons, in the development of agriculture in the USSR. The
transfer of American machine technology to the USSR has been documented
~ The three phases in the evolution of by Dalrymple.l-
can be observed.
Material transfer -- Unportation: In 192.4there
tractors in operation in the USSR. By 1934.the number
technology transfer
were only about 1,000
had increased to over
200,000. Approximately half of this total, was imported, mostly from the
United States. After 1931 imports dropped sharply.-13-
Design transfer -- Domestic Production: Tractor production in the
USSR rose from seventeen in 1924 to close to 5,000 in 1929. By 1933
production exceeded 50,000 and in 1934 approximated 100~000 units. This
development was also heavily dependent upon the contributions of U.S.
technology. The early Russian tractors were direct copies of U.S. nodels,
primarily Fordson and International Harvester machines. The Russian tractor
manufacturing plants were designed by American firms and constructed under
the direction of U.S. construction engineers who had been associated with




and Chicago, and American foremen were imported to train
help run the new plants.
early to middle 1930’s the Russians were producing re-
productions of their American tractors, in plants designed by Americans,
built under American supervision, and initially operated under American
supervision. In this way . . . the Russians were able to acquire
quickly and with very little effort the technical knowledge of tractor
production which had taken years to develop in this country.”~’
Capacity transfer: Beginning in 1922 the Russians also began to import
to the USSR American farmers and American farm management specialists to
advise in the organization of large scale mechanized farming units and to
instruct in the use of tractors. American influence in the adaptation of
mechanized production to the economic and technical conditions of Russian
agriculture was, however~ less pervasive than it was in tractor importation-14-
and production. From the beginning the productive use of the new equipment
was hampered by improper
.Aremarkable aspect
is that it has continued
16/ use and inadequate roaintenance.—
in the Soviet adoption of U.S. machine technology
to center on large scale tractors. There is still
no indication that machine size has been reduced to be more consistent with
factor endowments of’the economy. This seems to be explainable in terms of
the Russian motivation to mechanize agriculture. The Soviet efforts of
farm mechanization were
industrialization.
It was designed to
(by means of compulsory
peasantry. In terms of
inseparably related to Stalin’s policy of heavy
procure an agricultural surplus for industrialization
delivery) while breaking the economic power of the
this goal, the development of efficient small-scale
machinery, consistent with the peasant or family
was considered undesirable. Big tractors were a
to adapt to the socialist mode of production.
farm mode of production,
means of forcing peasants
Given the factor endowments in Russia, however, it was inevitable that
this Iarge-seal.e mechanization has led to a significant malallocation of
resources in Soviet agriculture.11’,1 Institutional constraints apparently
limited the ability of the Soviet farm machinery industry in developing the
capacity to design and produce farm machinery consistent with the factor en-
dowments of the USSR. As a
l!Mini-tractorizatiOn” $
less than ten horsepower in
result, the capacity transfer stage was aborted.
an introduction of the small-scale tractors of
post-War Japan, represents a clear contrast to-15-
this Russian experience. Before World War II, mechanization in Japan
was restricted to irrigation, drainage, and post-harvesting operations;
tractors were introduced only on an experimental scale.~t’ The number
of hand tractors on farms rose sharply from virtually nonexistence in
the 19401s to 89,000 in 1955, to 517,000 in 1960, and to 2,500,000 in
1965.
This post-war spurt of tractorization in Japanese agriculture may
partly be explained by the increased income of farm households due to
the land reform and by the relatively high food prices in the early
post-war period. Higher incomes, and higher returns to labor, induced
farmers to substitute tractor power for manual labor in crop production.
Supply pressure from the machinery industry was also important.
From the beginning of modern economic growth until the end of World
War 11 the Japanese machinery industry depended heavily on military pro-
curement. When this favored market was eliminated, after World War 11,
the industry was left with significant idle capacity, especially of
engineering and technical manpower, and was forced to divert part of




only 60 in 1945, to 34,OOO in
in 1965.
strong supply pressure of the
1955, to 305,000 in 1960,
machinery industry Japan
quickly bypassed the material transfer-importationphase, and advanced
to the capacity transfer phase. Small-scale tractors were imported from
abroad primarily for purposes of design transfer. The first tractors-16-
manufactured in Japan (called “power cultivators”) were subjec-bto several
defect~ including heavy body weights relative to the power generation and
inadequate design for paddy field operation.~/ These defects were soon
corrected. Two major developments which brought about the rapid growth of
tractorization in the mid-1950’s were (a) an increase in the power of the
“power cultivators” from less than five hp. to the range of five to ten
hp., which permitted a depth of cultivation comparable to the depth of
horse plowing, and (b) the development of small hand tractors in the low
hp. range with interchangeable attachments. These modifications made it
possible to replace draft animals completely by small-scale tractors in
paddy field operations.
Extremely rapid progress in the !~mini-tractorization” has puzzled
many Japanese agricultural economists. Some have questioned its efficiency
and have developed a hypothesis of !Iover-mechanization” based on demonstration
effects and other psychological elements.&!/ Tsuchiya’s recent study, however,
indicates that increased utilization of tractors can be explained by the efforts
of farmers to reduce production costs in response to rising wage rates relative
to the price of agricultural machines and equipment without invoking such
factors.Z/
In contrast to the Russian experience the Japan experience involved
the tailoring of tractors, and other farm machinery, to the size of the
individual production unit.-17-
IV.  TechnoJ-ogy  Transfer  and  Agr lcultura1  Trade
Successful  technology  transfer  frequEllit.ly  i:'}l,roduces  substantial
.
disequilibrium  in  factor  and  product  markets.  Tilt;; effects  are  not  con-
fined  to  domestic  markets,  but  frequently  spillover  into  the  international
economic  system.  Ceteris  paribus,  the  transfer  of  techno1ogy1imp1ies  a
reduction  in  the  "technology  gap"  among  areas  and  among  countries.  Com-
l">arative  advantage  for  a  certain  commodity  in  a  nation  which  initially
developed  the  superior  technology  for  the  commodity  may  be  lost  as  the
technology  is  transferred  abroad.  When  the  international  technol_ogy  gap
is  cJosed,  the  comparative  advantage  and  the  trade  matrix  will  be  deter-
mined  primarily  by  relative  factor  endowments.
In  order  to  understand  the  "feed-back"  of  international  technology
transfer  on  trade  relationships  the  "product  cycle  model"  deve:'oped  by
Raymond  Vernon  is  suggestive.52/  According  to  Vernon  both  the  new  consumer
goods  (e.g.,  automatic  washer)  and  producer  goods  of  labor-saving  character-
istics  (e.g.,  fork-lift)  tend  to  be  developed  initially  in  the  United  States
because  size  of  the  market,  with  a  large  number  of  high  income  consumers,
and  the  high  labor  cost  in  the  United  States  provide  a  favorable  environ-
ment  for  product  innovations.  In  spite  of  higher  labor  costs  in  the  United  States
Vernon  suggests  that  initial  production  capacity  for  new  consumer  and  producer
goods  will  tend  to  be  located  in  the  United  States  because  of  the  dynamic
interrelationships  between  innovative  effort  and  the  market  response  to  new
products  during  the  early  phases  of  technological  innovation,  product  design,-18-
and market development. For the initial producers of a new product for
the United States market these considerations are “far stronger than re~!.a-
tive factor-cost and transport considerations” that have been emphasized
in traditional trade and location analysis.
Following the period of product innovation and modification a certain
degree of product standardization takes place. As the need for flexibility
declines, technical possibilities for achieving economies of scale open up.
Initially the manufacturing plants tend to be located within the TJnited
States because it is the only market large enough to exploit the scale
economies. Thus, from the product innovation to the early stage of standard-
ized production, the United States remains as a dominant exporter of the new
products. As the non-U.S. market expands and the product standardization is
completed, the production capacity is built in other advanced countries and
finally the international firms begin to service the third-country markets
or even the home market from overseas locations characterized by lower
labor costs.
“If economies of scale are being fully exploited, the principle
differences between any two locations are likely to be labor costti.
Accordingly, it may prove wise for the international firm to begin servicing
third-country markets from the new location. And if labor costs differences
are large enough to offset transport costs> then exports back to the United
States may become a possibility as well.!r~
The Vernon model is designed to analyze the innovation-investment-
trade sequences in industrial production. In agriculture, however~ it is-19-
not the standardization of the product or the production process which
facilitates the transfer of new production capacity from the developed
to less developed countries. Ratherj it is the establishment of an agri-
cultural experiment station system in the recipient countries with capacity
to conduct the research and development necessary to adapt foreign materials
and designs for local adoption. Yet, once such a system is established and
the production potentials implicit in foreign technology are being fully
exploited, comparative advantages tend to be determined by differences in
factor endowments among countries. The initial advantage of an innovator
may be lost as the new technology is transferred among countries as a
result of local adaptation and development.
The case of sugarcane examined in the previous section provides an
example illustrating the sequence following innovation and
The Java station (P.O.J.) was the leading generator of new




relative advantage over other sugar producing countries. The lttechnology
gap” became widest around 1930. After 1930 the decline in world demand and
the widespread diffusion of the capacity
varieties in other sugar producing areas
sugar exports from Java.
A more dramatic example may be seen
to breed superior “location specific”
(except Cuba) led to a decline in
in the ‘processof transferring rice
production technology from Japan to Taiwan and Korea during the inter-war
period.~i The agricultural productivity growth of Japan from the beginning-20-
of modern economic growth following the Meiji
War I was supported by the propagation of the
Restoration (1$68) to World
better farmers’ techniques
screened, and tailored by experiment station workers following the modern
agricultural science tradition of Germany. The initial phase of rice
yield increase was caused
by veteran farmers (




diffusion of superior varieties selected
the western part of ,Japan, which included
and Northern Kyushu).~6/ These superior
varieties in the West provided the proto-type for farmers and experiment
station workers in the East in developing improved vwrieties for their
ecologies. The experiment stations in their early d~ys contributed to
agricultural productivity growth
than by supplying new potential.
By adequately screening and
by exploiting indige:nousp otential rather
tailoring veteran farmers! varieties and
practices, Japan was able to obtain substantial increases in agricultural
productivity by exploiting the indigenous technological potential. Through
the diffusion of these technique, first among the western prefectures and
later among theeasternprefectures, domestic rice production was able to
supply about 95 percent of the domestic consumption during the period of
the big spurt in industrializationbetween the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05)
and World War I. The impact of the indigenous technological potential on
productivity gradually declined, however, as it became widely diffused.
The exploitation of indigenous potential and the lag in scientific
research in supplying new potential, when confronted with the expansion of
demand due to World War I, resulted in a serious rice shortage and forced.~)-
the rice price to rise to an unprecedented level. l!h~.u








reaction of the government to the Rice Riot was to organize
to import rice from the overseas territories of Korea and Taiwan.
to create a rice surplus to export to Japanj short-run exploitation
were adopted. In Korea this involved importing sorghum (mile)
from Manchuria and forcing farmers to substitute this lower quality grain
for rice in domestic consumption. A similar squeeze was also practiced in




was enforced by (a.
monopoly sales of
squeeze on real income through taxation
such commodities as liquor, tobacco, and
The longer-run program was to introduce development programs designed
to increase the yield and output nf rice in the two colonial territories.
Under the program titled Sanmai Zoshoku Keikaku (Rice Production Development — -.— —
Program), the Japanese government invested in irrigation and water control
and in research and extension in order to develop and diffuse high yielding
Japanese rice varieties adapted to the local ecology of Korea and Taiwan.
Success of this effort created a tremendous rice surplus which flooded into
the Japanese market. As shown in Table 1, within the 20 years from 191.5to
1935 net imports of rice from Korea to Japan rose from 170 to 1,212 thousand
metric tons per year, and net imports from Taiwan rose from 113 to 705 thousand
metric tons. AS the result of the inflow of colonial rice the net import of





















































































































The success of the government program in developing Korea and
Taiwan as major suppliers of rice to Japan had a major impact on rice
prices and production in Japan. Such large scale imports of rice, a
commodity characterized by a relatively inelastic demand schedule,
significantly lowered the price and discouraged the production of rice
in Japan. A deterioration in the price and in the terms of trade for
rice during this period was the logical consequence of the policies
designed to increase imports from Kcmea and Taiwan. w
Both the motivation and consequence of the colonial rice development
program are illustrated in Figure 1 which compares the trends of rice
yield per hectare in Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. Yield per hectare in
Korea and Taiwan began to take off h the 19201s when the growth deceler-
ated in Japan. This reflects the process we have discussed so far:
(a) The Japanese govermnent launched the colonial rice development program
when pressed by the food problem arising from the deceleration in the
growth of rice yield per hectare in Japan and rising food demand from a
growing nonagricultural population. (b) The success of the program in
raising rice production and productivity in the two colonies permitted
large scale imports of rice from these territories, which in turn depressed
the price and further discouraged liheproduction of rice in Japan.
The success of the colonial rice development program was a mixed bless-
ing for Japan. It depressed the price and the income of farmers and contributed
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Figure 1. Rice yields per hectare planted for Japan, Taiwan and Korea,
five-year moving average, 1895-1.935.
Eastern prefectures: Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Akita, yamagata, F~~kUshi-ma,
Tbaragi, Tochi.gi, Gunma, Chiba, Saitama, Tokyo,
Kanagawa, Niigata, Nagano, Yamanashi, Shizuoka, Aichi.
Western prefectures: Toyama, “[shj.kawa,Fukui., Gifu, Mi.c, S}liga, Kyoto, Osaka,
lIyogo, Nara, Wakayama, Tottori, Shi.mane, (ll~ayama,
IIiroshima, Yamaguchi, ‘rokushima, Kagawa, I~him~, ~ochi,
Fukuoka, saga,, Nagasaki., Kumamoto, Ojta, Miy:~zakl,
Kagoshima.
Source : Nobufumi Kayo, fed.), Ni,hon Nogyo K.iso Tokci (Basic Agricultural
Stat.ist.icsor Japan), “ml: Norin-=~=angyo Seisansei. Kojo l{aigi,
1958); Taiwan [government-General, ~_iwa~ Nogy o Nenpo [Ycarhook of
Taiwan Agriculture), (Taipei-), v:lrlo~lsl-s~l~es;Korea C~v~rnmerit-
General , Nogyo Tokeihy o (Agricultural Statistics) , (Seou~] ~
various issues.-25-
reformists made this social uneasiness and disorder among farmers the
springboard for the invasion of
adventures which followed. The
after the Rice Riot in 1918 had
and political implications.
Manchuria in 1931 and the other military
policy decision concerning the rice supply
thus
Why did the economic effects c)f
in Japan$ to produce the ~’classical”
not only economic but vast social
colonial development policy fail,
results associated with the importa-
tion of cheap grain into England from colonial areas and other areas of
new settlement in the 19th Century? The answer seems, at least in part,
to be associated with the different structure of agriculture and the
different pattern of industrial development in the two countries when the
policies of dependence on overseas sources of food supply was initiated.
The inflow of cheap grain to Nngland following the repeal of the Corn
Laws in 1846 was accompanied by the continuing absorption of labor into




production and toward a more intensive system of livestock agri-
The transformation was facilitated by rising incomes in the
sector which stimulated the demand for the
agriculture.
A number of obstacles impeded the achievement of
transformation in Japan in response to rising imports
products of an animal
a similar agricultural
and declining prices of
grain during the interwar period. Japanese agriculture was rigidly locked
into a sophisticated labor intensive system of crop production, highly de-
pendent on irrigation and fertilizer as leading inputs. There was not a-26-
full.yadequate basis, in either agricultural research or industrial. infra-
structure, -tomake a rapid transformation from grain production to a more
diversified agricultural system. Furthermore, the rise in imports of grain
was not accompanied, in Japan, by rapid growth in the demand for labor by
the industrial sector. The demand for labor in the industrial sector ,
slackened after 1920 as a result of (a) contraction ofworld demand for the
products of Japanese industry after World War I, (b) contraction of domestic
demand due to the deflation policy adopted to permit a return to the gold
standard at a prewar parity, and (c) the adoption of an industrial ration-
alization policy in an attempt to stay competitive in world markets. This
policy placed major emphasis on attempts to increase productivity and to
save labor through more capital intensive methods of production. Finally,
income levels in the urban industrial sector of the Japanese economy remained
too low to create a large increase in the demand for the products of a more
diversified agriculture.-2’7-
‘v’ * Technology Transfer and the Green Revolution
The most dramatic example of agricultural technology transfer during
the last several decades has involved the recent development and diffusion
of new high-yielding varieties (HYV’S) of rice, wheat, and maize in the
tropics (Table 11).~ We will.analyze this so-called ‘rgreen revolutionfl
in the light of the theory and history of international technology transfer
that we have reviewed so far.
Organizations for the transfer of technology~
Of particular significance is the fact that the development of the
HYV!S represents a process of agricultural technology transfer from the
temperate zone to tropical and sub-tropical zones through the transfer of
scientific knowledge and research capacity. Long before the 1960’s the
HYV~s had been developed in Jal?an,the United States, and other developed
countries in the temperate zone. The direct transfer of these superior
varieties had, however, been inhibited “bydifferences in ecological con-
ditions. Technological- transfer was delayed by lack of experiment station
!Tnroto-type” varieties which capacity to develop HYV’S comparable to the . .
~ It is particularly significant that existed in the temperate zone.2
this new capacity was directed to improvement in yield of the staple food
crops consumed domestically, rather than to the “enclave” tropical export
commodities which had received primary attention under colonial administr
tion.-28-
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1971], p;’, 35,36.-23-
Within the tropics the diffusion of the new cereals technology from
Mexico (wheat) and the Philippines (rice) was characterized by an initial
material-transfer phase. The initial impact of the diffusion of the new
varieties on grain production in Pakistan, India, Malaysia~ Turkey, Mexico,
and other countries involved the direct transfer of seed of the new varieties
from Mexico and the Philippines; and of fertilizer, insecticides> and fungi-
cides from Japan, the United States, and Western Europe. In other countries,
such as Thailand, the impact was delayed until.the design and capacity trans-
fer phases could be achieved, in order to maintain the quality characteristics
of the Thai varieties whirh are important in the export market for Thai rice.
In the countries that benefited initially from material transfer, there has
been a rapid movement to develop the local experiment station capacity that
will permit ‘themto move to the design-transfer and capacity-transfer stages
in the development of ecologically adapted varieties. There is also, in many
countries, a move toward the development of a domestic fertilizer and agricul-
tural chemical industry based primarily on developed-country designs. W
The adaptive research that led to the development of HYV’s was primarily
conducted at a new set of international agricultural research centers. These
centers are typically supported by major U.S. Foundations. They are staffed
by international teams of scientists of various agricultural science disci-
plines and by in-service trainees, and coordinated by a common orientation to
produce major breakthroughs in the yield potentials of certain staple cereals.~
Establishment of these research-training centers can be considered as an insti-
tutional innovation facilitating the transfer of an “ecology-bound”Iocation.30-
specific agricultural technology from temperate zone developed countries to
tropical zone developing countries. It id useful, therefore, to review the
evol.uiionof these institutions, particularly the International Center for
Corn and Wheat Improvement (CIMMYT) in Mexico and the International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines. Similar international centers
have recently been established in Colombia (CIAT) and Nigeria (IITA). The





and IRRI do not, of course, represent completely new concepts
organization. Commodity-centeredresearch institutes established
in the tropics under British, Dutch, and Belgian Colonial auspices have been
responsible for substantial productivity gains in the production of tropical
export crops. The new international institutes represent an extension and
further evolution of an already established institutional pattern.31 J
The Rockefeller Foundation Agricultural Sciences program, which eventually
led to the establishment of CINMYT and IRRI, was initiated in 1943 with the
establishment of the Office of Special Studies (Oficina de Estuidos Especiales)
in the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture. ~ Field research programs were first
initiated with wheat and corn. The program later expanded to include field
beans, potatoes, sorghum, vegetable crops, and animal sciences. A common
pattern of staffing was followed for each commodity program. A. U.S. special-
ist was brought in as each commodity program was initiated, Each specialist
assembled a staff of young Mexican college graduates who were trained in
research methods and practices as part of the research program, rather than
through a formal program of graduate studies.-31-
In retrospect, the staffing program adopted by the Foundation and
centered around a project leader for each commodity did have one major
limitation. In situations where progress depended on the solution to a
complex set of interrelated problems in varietal improvement and crop-
production practices, the commodity specialist was rarely able to bring
to bear the range of disciplinary knowledge and technical skill needed
to achieve progress in crop production. This can be illustrated by
comparing the relative progress of the wheat and corn programs. The
wheat program achieved technical success earlier and its impact on yield
per hectare and on total wheat production has been greater than for the
other commodity programs. New wheat varieties were being distributed
to farmers by the fall of 1948. By 1956 the production impact was
sufficient to make Mexico independent of imported wheat.
The rapid progress of the wheat program was clearly related to
the special competence of the early leaders of the wheat program in the
fields of plant pathology and genetics and the fact that stem rust was
a dominant factor limiting wheat yields. It was also facilitated by
effective institutional linkages with related programs in the U.S. and
elsewhere.~
Improvement in corn yields occurred much more slowly. In addition
to a more complex set of biological factors, the institutional consider-
ations involved in seed multiplication, distribution, and diffusion were
more difficult. In retrospect, it appears that success would have been
more rapid if initial efforts had been directed to the development of high
yielding synthetic varieties rather than double-cross hybrids.!
-32-  I
In  situations  where  the  technical,  production,  and organizational  I
problems  were  relatively  complex,  requiring  contrib"lAtions  from  a  broad .
spectr~~  of  biological  and  social  scientists,  the  staffing  pattern  worked
.out  during  the  early  years  of  the  Mexican  program  was not  entirely  con-
sistent  with  rapid  progress  in  the  solution  of  research  and  production
problems.  In  these  more  complex  situations  a multidisciplinary  team
approach  emerged as  a  more  appropriate  strategy  than  the  simple  commodity
specialist  approach  of  the  early  years.
A major  source  of  strength  in  the  success  of  the  Rockefeller  Foundation
program  in  Mexico  was  its  economical  use  of  the  scarce  professional  manpower
available  in  Mexico  both  at  the  beginning  and  throughout  the  program.  The
shortage  of  professional  manpower and  of  indigenous  educational  resources
was  conducive  to  the  development  of  an  internship  system  which  intimately
linked  professional  education  with  investigation.
By 1963  agricultural  science  had  been  successfully  institutionalized  in
Mexico.  On December 30,1960,  the  Office  of  Special  Studies  was dissolved
and merged  into  a  new National  Institute  of  Agricultural  Research  (INIA)
under  Mexican  direction.  The  Rockefeller  Foundation  program  staff  in  Mexico
was reorganized  into  a  new International  Center  for  Corn  and  Wheat  Improvement
(CIMMYT).  The  shift  of  the  national  program  to  Mexican  management involved
.serious  emotional  strain.  One of  the  more  difficult  problems  faced  by  the
Rockefeller  Foundation  staff  in  making  the  transition  was  the  recognition  that
they  would  occupy  a marginal  role  in  a  program  which  they  had developed.  In
technical  assistance  programs,  the  disengagement  phase  is  often  more  difficult
than  the  institutional-building  phase.-33-
The significance of the disengagement is that it symbolized Mexican
success of agricultural science as a career service in which men could
enter with confidence that their contributions would be rewarded both in
money and in professional recognition. It is also significant that on
May 14, 1963, advanced degrees in the agricultural sciences were conferred
for the first time in Mexico. Mexicofs new capacity to produce trained
manpower in the agricultural sciences is developing in response to the
demand for scientific manpower generated by the success of the initial
thrust of the technical revolution in Mexican agriculture.
The establishment of the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI)
in the Rilippines in 1962 represents a second major landmark in the evolution
of the agricultural science program of the Rockefeller Foundation. The IRRI
was jointly financed by the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations and established
as an international research and training institute rather than as a component
of a national ministry of agriculture. It was staffed by an international
team of scientists representing eight different nationalities. Recognition
of the complexity of the problem of achieving higher yield potentials and the
multi-disciplinary competence that would be required to solve the biological
problems posed thereby and to achieve rapid increases in total national and
regional output were recognized and carefully structured into the staffing
plan.~ hintensive pro~mof setinars andresearch pro~m reviews was
initiated to focus the efforts of the diverse multinational an? multidisci-
plinary team on a common set of objectives and to achieve the complementarily
among the several disciplines necessary to invent, develop, and diffuse a new
high-produc-tivity rice technology.-34-
The location of the IRRI in Los Banes, adjacent to the University of
the Philippines College of Agriculture (“(JPCA), made professional resources
available to the IRRI that had not been available in Mexico. The UPCA
had already developed relatively strong departments in several fields of
agricultural science. Joint appointments of IRRI staff to the UP graduate
school strengthened the graduate research capacity of the UPCA. This
arrangement permitted many of the IRRI trainees to work toward M.S. degrees
under the direction of an IRRI staff member while simultaneously engaging
in a highly complementary research “internship” at the Institute.
Within six years after the initiation of the research program at the
IRRI, a series of new rice varieties with yield potentials roughly double
that of the varieties that were previously available to farmers in most
areas of Southeast Asia had been developed. By the late 196o’s progress
had proceeded far enough to have a measurable impact on aggregate production.
&/
The significance of the international institute experience, both in
Latin America and in Asia, goes well beyond the impact of the new wheat,
corn, and rice technology in at least two respects. The most important
contribution was the evolution of an institutional pattern for the organiza-
tion of scientific resources which can be replicated for a wide variety of
crops and localities with a reasonable probability of success. It is now
possible to organize a multidisciplinary team of biological, physical, and
social scientists capable of adapting any new biological and chemical tech-
nology for crop production to local growing conditions, and to make this
technology available to farmers in a form that they are capable of accepting
within the relatively short period of five to ten years,-35-
According to Rasmussen, the !~systems approach,llin which the multi-
disciplinary teams of scientists cooperate to solve a problem, characterizes
modern development in agricultural technology in the United States and other
developed countries, in contrast to the traditional Ifcomponent approach,tr
in which individual inventors and scientists work sporadically according
to their inspiration and insight.~ The International Institute experience
clearly demonstrates the possibility of transmitting the “systems approach”
to the less developed countries.
A second contribution of the new international centers was the evolution
of a technique for establishing a set of linkages with national and local
education and research centers. This technique includes activities such as
exchanges of staff, professional conferences, support of graduate and post-
graduate training, personal consultations, and exchange of genetic materials.
An institutional infrastructure that is capable, at least in part, of off-
setting the inability to fully exploit the economies of scale, which charac-
terize the larger national research systems, is evolving. This communication
function of the internationa.linstitutes is particularly important for the
experiment stations located in the smaller countries where the development
of a broad-based national research system is limited.
The internationalresearchtraining institute approach clearly represents
an effective institutional innovation in the process of technology transfer.
It has been particularly effective in situations characterized by a supply
.._-e — -. .—
of indigenous scientific eriment stationcapacity that is < —=......—.—- --- ._ . . . ..___-—--”
inadequate to achieve effective. realization of the scale economies inherent —-–—. ..—-,—- =_.. ----- .
in research and development activities, and in fostering the development of
_,,.,..,, “,- . . . . . . . . . ... . . .-. . . . . ..~.36-
regional research and training infrastructurewhich can contribute to the
support of self-sustainingprogress of agricultural technology. The next
stage in this development must be the strengthening of national research
~ Inafewcountries this maymean and production education systems, 7
the building of new national research systems. In most countries the
task is much more complex. It involves the transformation of existing
national research systems into productive sources of new technical knowledge.~
Feedback effects of technology transfer and a~ricultural readjustments
It is almost inevitable that the dramatic transfer of technology
which generated the green revolution would result in substantial stress
on several institutions in the relatively underdeveloped economies of the
topics where these changes are occurring.
Immediate bottlenecks are emerging in the capacity of the marketing
system to handle the sharp increase in the marketable surplus. In the
spring of 1968 Northern India found the existing marketing facilities in-
adequate for handling the increased output of wheat. Substantial amounts
of grain were stored in schools or even left uncovered on the ground.
In the Philippines lack of artificial drying facilities for rice harvested
during the monsoon season has represented a bottleneck for expansion of
double cropping of rice.
Channels of input and credit supply represent equally urgent constraints.
In order to exploit the production potential of HYV’s, fertilizer and other
technical inputs must be supplied at the right time and in the right places.
Farmers require credit in order to meet the increased cash outlay for the-37-
procurement of larger amounts of technical inputs. The existing credit
and input market facilities have in some areas represented serious
constraints on the progress of the green revolution.
These bottlenecks impede the realization of production potential of
new technology. At the same time, however, they can be powerful sources
of forward and backward linkages~in Hirschman’s sense~in transmitting
the impact of the new technology in agricultural production to other
~ !llhemarketi ngbottlene ckinthegre enrevolution, sectors of the economy.3
for example, implies that the pay-off to investment in agricultural
marketing is increased by the development of HYV’s.
induced
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and income will be
functions properly, the new seed-fertilizer
its production
contribute to sustained growth in the
A secular consequence of rapid growth
to demand, is a downward shift in the
potential and at the same time
nonagricultural sector of the economy.
in agricultural output, relative
aggregate cost and supply schedules
for food staples, The effect is to transfer at least part of the gain
in agricultural productivity from farmers to other sectors of the economy.
When the aggregate supply of commodities which are characterized by
inelastic demand~ such as staple cereals, shifts downward, the decline
in the prices may exceed the increase in the output, resulting in a
o decline in the income of farmers. O-38-
Technological change may also contribute to the widening income
disparities among farmers. The relative income position of farmers who
have no access to new technology due~ for e=mple~ to the lack of
irrigation facilities will worsen as the aggregate supply schedule shifts
to the right. Declining prices and widening income disparity among
farm producers may contributato significant social tension and disruption
in rural areas and major political instability at the national level.L&’
These problems can be magnified in the international dimension. As
traditional food deficit countries, such as The Philippines and Pakistan,
shift from a grain importing to a grain exporting status and other countries?
such as India and Indonesia9reducethe gap between production and utilization,
substantial price disruption is likely in internationalmarkets, This
would have severe repercussions on the foreign exchange earnings of food
exporting countries, such as Thailand and Burma, and may result in
significant reduction in the trade among countries in Asia.w
The problem of converting current or potential food surpluses into
a basis for sustained economic growth poses an extremely difficult
problem for most countries of South and Southeast Asia during the next
decade. The continuing decline of export opportunities and prices
sharply reduces the opportunity to use surplus production to earn the
foreign exchange needed to finance domestic development. Furthermore,
the relatively large share of the population engaged in agricultural
production and the slow (absolute)growth in nonfarm employment
opportunities limits the economic gains that can be realized by using the-39-
surpluses primarily to support employment in the urban-industrial sectors>
unless the transfer of surpluses is also accompanied by lower food prices.
Thus, if Japan and other developed countries do not adopt less
protectionist policies with respect to their domestic agriculture, the
economies of Southeast Asia are likely to face difficulties during the
19’70!ssimilar to those faced by the Japanese economy during the inter-
war period. The main difference is that the downward pressure on rice
prices in these countries will come from increased supplies generated
from internal rather than colonial sources.
The Japanese experience during the interwar period indicates that
for the economic and social conditions of Asian agriculture it is extremely
difficult to achieve structural adjustments comparable to those associated
with the agricultural transformation in l$lthcentury England. Unique
patterns and processes of agricultural readjustments have to be
discovered which are feasible for Asian conditions.
In contrast to the interwar period, aggregate world trade is expanding
even though trade’in food grains is contracting. Demand for feed grains
and luxury food items are increasing rapidly. Maize in Thailand, asparagus
and mushrooms in Taiwan represent examples of success in diverting resources
from food grains to the production of the commodities for which world
demand is undergoing more rapid expansion. It is suggestive that these
successes were achieved in the traditional food surplus countries in
Asia.-.!+o-
Another possibility is that as the reduced real cost and prices of
food staples become reflected in wage rates they will resultin downward
shifts in the cost schedule for rubber, copra, plywood, and other tropical
export commodities. To the extent that this counteracts the competition
from synthetics and temperate zone agricultural products, the traditional
export crop sector could again emerge as a leading sector in some tropical.
economies.
Whether these possibilities materialize depends, to a large extent,
on the efficient allocation of agricultural research. Research is essential
to discover and develop new profitable crops. The competitive position
of traditional export crops must be maintained and reinforced by continuous
improvements in technology. It is unlikely that countries in South and
Southeast Asia can attain a successful agricultural. transformation if
technical progress brought about by the transfer of scientific knowledge
and capacity is limited to the food cereal sector.
Critical to the efficient reallocation of resources~ including
research resources, is an efficient system of prices which accurately
reflect changes in the demand and supply of outputs and inputs in the
economy. If the governments of South and Southeast Asian countries divert
substantial resources to maintain the present level of food cereal pricesg
the result will be malallocation of resources not only by farmers but
also by agricultural‘scientistsand agricultural supply firms. In
consequence, the cost schedules of these surplus commodities will continue
to shift downward relatively more rapidly; and the disequilibrium will
be widened.-4J--
The developing countries cannot afford to duplicate the costly
experience of the developed countries during the past two decades. The
developed countries can bear the heavy direct costs and the waste of
resources resulting from high agricultural price supports. In most
developed countries agriculture generates less than ten percent of the
national income. Price supports have been effective in easing the social
tensions within the rural population. Most developing countries do
not have either the administrative capacity or the resources to pursue
high price support policies. Though painful, they will be forced to
follow a route ‘towards agricultural readjustments under efficient price
signals. Price support programs can be used for stabilization purposes
and as a guide to efficient resource use decisions if they are not
distorted by overly ambitious income transfer objectives. w
The problem of attaining an efficient reallocation of agricultural
resources while maintaining sufficient equity in welfare among the rural
population and between the rural and urban sectors will require extreme
skill. It may generate more social tension than the political structures




There are three major implications of the material presented in
paper on which we would like to place particular emphasis.
(a) The international transfer of agricultural technology involves
the domestication of exotic plants and genetic materials to local
ecologies and modification in the design and use of machines, chemicals~
and cultivation techniques to be consistent with the factor endowments
and relative factor prices in recipient countries. Failure of a
nabion to institutionalizedomestic research capacity can result in
serious impediments to effective international technology transfer.
A major challenge for the developing countries is to develop the
scientific and institutional capacity to design and adapt location
specific agricultural technology to the resource endowments and economic
environments in which the new agricultural technology is to be employed.
(b) Most developing countries are too small to develop a fully
articulated viable agricultural research system. National agricultural
research systems of all except the very largest countries are likely
to be most effective if they are linked into an international research
network which provides for effective scientific communication and the
transfer of genetic materials, research methods, and scientific personnel.
A new set of international agricultural research centers is now emerging
which, if developed
much more effective
than has existed in
effectively, can provide the institutional basis for
international diffusion of agricultural technology
the past.-43-
(C) Effective international diffusion of agricultural technology
can be expected to have substantial ‘ffeedback” effects on trade relationships
and domestic prices through the operation of international commodity
markets. Our review of the experience of a number of countries over the
past century leads us to place greater emphasis on the creation of the
capacity of agricultural science to create new and more effective
production alternatives than on attempts to achieve a high degree of
organization or management of world commodity markets.-44-
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